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ABSTRACT In this article, we present a comprehensive study with an experimental analysis of federated
deep learning approaches for cyber security in the Internet of Things (IoT) applications. Specifically, we first
provide a review of the federated learning-based security and privacy systems for several types of IoT
applications, including, Industrial IoT, Edge Computing, Internet of Drones, Internet of Healthcare Things,
Internet of Vehicles, etc. Second, the use of federated learning with blockchain and malware/intrusion
detection systems for IoT applications is discussed. Then, we review the vulnerabilities in federated
learning-based security and privacy systems. Finally, we provide an experimental analysis of federated deep
learning with three deep learning approaches, namely, Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN), and Deep Neural Network (DNN). For each deep learning model, we study
the performance of centralized and federated learning under three new real IoT traffic datasets, namely,
the Bot-IoT dataset, the MQTTset dataset, and the TON_IoT dataset. The goal of this article is to provide
important information on federated deep learning approaches with emerging technologies for cyber security.
In addition, it demonstrates that federated deep learning approaches outperform the classic/centralized
versions of machine learning (non-federated learning) in assuring the privacy of IoT device data and provide
the higher accuracy in detecting attacks.
INDEX TERMS Federated learning, intrusion detection, deep learning, cyber security, the IoT, blockchain.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Internet of Things (IoT) is defined as the use of communication protocols and sensing equipments such as sensors,
laser scanners, radio frequency identification, etc., to enable
control system devices to be connected to the Internet. During
the last few years, IoT technology has been widely used
in the following areas: Internet of Vehicles, Manufacturing
industry, Internet of Drones, Internet of Healthcare Things,
Mobile Crowdsensing, Cyber physical systems, Agriculture,
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Vicente Alarcon-Aquino
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etc [1]. As IoT technology develops rapidly, there are millions
of embedded physical devices, where each IoT device is
interconnected and exposing data that can potentially affect
the privacy and personal well-being of their users. In the
absence of a credible security defense systems implemented
on the IoT devices, they can be attacked by hackers [2] and are
representing a large attack surface that is actively exploited.
The availability of modern Machine Learning (ML) is
gaining more attention than ever before for its potential to
extract useful and complex data models using large datasets
from a central location [3]. With traditional machine learning,
the learning data is collected on a centralized server. without
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FIGURE 1. Centralized vs. Federated learning.

addressing the privacy concerns as well as reducing data
transmission cost. In addition to other security measures, such
as Blockchain and authentication [4], [5], the machine learning techniques can be used by intrusion detection systems in
order to identify normal and malicious actions [6], [7].
The term of privacy-preserving machine learning has
become popular nowadays [8]. The idea of federated learning
is proposed by Google [9] to overcome data privacy issues
by leveraging collaborative learning across a wide range of
devices (i.e., IoT devices). However, there are various limitations to the application of traditional federated learning in IoT
applications, including, the reliability of the learning model
as well as of the central server. By modifying the local model,
if the central server (i.e., Edge server) crashed or modified
the global model maliciously, updating accuracy of all local
models at IoT devices will be significantly affected [10]–[16].
The constraint of power in IoT devices is a major issue for the
deployment of federated learning. This resource limitation
requires that energy consumption should be optimized for the
implementation of federated learning [17].
The federated learning achieves great success and is widely
used in many fields, e.g., mobile edge network optimization [18], Google keyboard query suggestions and prediction [19], [20], COVID-19 detection [21]–[23], vehicles
communications [24], Internet of Drones [25], Augmented
reality [26], Intrusion detection [27]–[29] etc. Therefore,
many cyber security researchers have difficulty in finding
the best learning type (i.e., centralized or federated learning) to test and evaluate their proposed security methods in
IoT applications, and selecting an appropriate federated deep
138510

learning method is an essential issue in this field. Hence,
we are motivated to realize a comprehensive study with an
experimental analysis of the use of federated deep learning
for cyber security in the Internet of Things.
A. CENTRALIZED VS. FEDERATED LEARNING TYPES

Fig 1 illustrates the main difference between federated learning and centralized learning.
1) CENTRALIZED LEARNING

Machine learning for IoT applications has conventionally
been performed by uploading all the data from each IoT
device connected with the cloud servers to build a standard model which can be shared and implemented across
devices. The main benefit of centralized learning is the ability
of the model to perform generalization using data from a
cluster of IoT devices and then work with other relevant
IoT devices instantaneously. However, there are some issues
for traditional centralized learning such as privacy, latency,
bandwidth, and connectivity.
2) FEDERATED LEARNING

The core concept of federated learning is to create machine
learning models that are built on distributed datasets across
different devices while avoiding the leakage of data. Specifically, federated learning is a new technique where the current
model is downloaded and an updated model is computed on
IoT devices using the local IoT data. These locally trained
models are then returned from the IoT devices to the central server for aggregation, (e.g., the weights are averaged)
VOLUME 9, 2021
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FIGURE 2. Federated learning types.

and then a combined and enhanced single global model is
returned to IoT devices. The distribution of data is important
in terms of federated learning deployment and the associated
practical and technical challenges. There are currently the following three federated learning types, as presented in Fig 2:
•

•

•

Horizontal federated learning: This type is implemented
in situations in which the data sets share the same feature
space but differ in the sampling space.
Vertical federated learning: This type is implemented in
the situations in which the data sets differ in the feature
space but share the same sampling space.
Federated transfer learning: This type is implemented in
the situations where the data sets has different feature
space as well as different sampling space.

B. RELATED SURVEYS AND OUR CONTRIBUTIONS

There are many surveys in the literature that have covered
different aspects of federated learning-based frameworks for
IoT. As shown in Tab. 1, we classify the federated learning
surveys based on the following dimensions:
•

•

•

•

IoT application: It indicates whether the survey presented a taxonomy for federated learning-based frameworks for cyber security in the internet of things.
Federated learning-based IDS: It reports whether the
study provided a taxonomy for federated learning-based
cyber security intrusion detection systems for the IoT.
Federated learning-based blockchain: It indicates
whether the survey reviewed federated learning-based
frameworks coupled with blockchain technology for
cyber security in the internet of things.
Threat models in federated learning: It indicates
whether the survey considered threat models in

VOLUME 9, 2021

federated learning-based frameworks for cyber security
in IoT.
• Experimental analysis in IoT: It indicates whether the
survey provided an experimental analysis of federated
deep learning for cyber security in IoT.
Almost all of the surveys on federated learning for
IoT applications present security and privacy countermeasures without focusing on an experimental analysis.
Yang et al. [30] proposed a review of a secure federatedlearning framework, which includes federated transfer learning, vertical federated learning, and horizontal federated
learning. Aledhari et al. [32] a review of federated learning
algorithms, which includes use-cases, real-life applications,
and hardware platforms. Liu et al. [33] provided an introduction about the integration of federated learning in the
context of 6G communications. Jiang et al. [34] presented
the challenges and opportunities of the application of federated learning in smart city sensing. Mothukuri et al. [36]
provided a comprehensive survey on privacy threats of federated learning, but without an experimental analysis in
IoT networks. Kholod et al. [37] analyzed the open-source
federated learning frameworks for IoT applications without
focusing in cyber security. Rahman et al. [38] provided a
comprehensive taxonomies covering privacy and security,
resource management, application areas, system models and
designs. Nguyen et al. [39] provided a comprehensive survey about the recent advances in federated learning and
IoT applications. Wahab et al. [41] presented a multi-level
classification of federated machine learning in communication and networking systems. Ali et al. [42] provided
an overview about the integration of federated learning and blockchain for IoT applications. Imteaj et al. [43]
analyzed the implementation challenges of federated
138511
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TABLE 1. Related surveys on federated learning for IoT networks.

learning algorithms for resource-constrained IoT devices.
Nguyen et al. [40] provided an overview of the essential
notions about the integration of federated learning and
blockchain in mobile edge computing networks. All these
related surveys did not cover the application of federated deep
learning for cyber security in IoT applications with focusing
on experimental analysis.
Lyu et al. [35] provided a brief introduction into FL,
alongside a classification for threat models into two major
attacks: poisoning and inference attacks. The study points
out the insights, the core techniques together with the fundamental assumptions embraced by the different attacks. The
FL context brings an additional threat, which is model poisoning, distinct from traditional data poisoning. The goal is
to make the global model incorrectly classify a given set of
inputs. To explore this issue, Bhagoji et al. [44] conducted
a range of attack scenarios, including: targeted model poisoning by intensifying the malicious agent update, improving
138512

attack stealth through the use of an alternating minimization strategy, and bypassing Byzantine-resistant aggregation
strategies. Which validated the vulnerabilities of FL-based
settings to model poisoning attacks. Xu et al. [45] proposed
a FL-based privacy preservation scheme, called VerifyNet,
which manages the verification of the training process, with
homomorphic encryption, pseudo-random technology, and a
double-masking protocol to ensure user privacy, verifiability, and confidentiality during the FL process. Results from
experiments with real-world data have proved that VerifyNet
is practical.
A notable exception is Goa et al.’s [46] recent work
that reviews split and federated learning approaches with
respect to their communication overheads and conducts an
experimental evaluation against two established data-sets
for Speech Command and ECG in a Raspberry Pie setup.
In this context, we highlight the following research questions
(i.e., Fig 17 that need to be solved:

VOLUME 9, 2021
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FIGURE 3. Discussed questions per article section.

Q1. What are the applications of federated deep learning
in IoT networks?
• Q2. What and how is the federated learning used for
intrusion and malware detection?
• Q3. What characteristics do the federated learning
approaches with blockchain technology have for each of
the IoT applications?
• Q4. What are potential vulnerabilities that can be
exploited by adversaries in federated learning-based systems for IoT networks?
• Q5. What is currently the best solution between
federated deep learning approaches and the classic/centralized versions of machine learning (nonfederated learning) in assuring the privacy of IoT device
data and providing the highest accuracy in detecting
attacks?
To answer the previous questions, the main contributions
of this work are:
• We review the federated learning-based security and
privacy systems for several types of IoT applications.
• We review the federated learning-based cyber security
intrusion detection systems.
• We present the use of federated learning with blockchain
for IoT applications.
• We review vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries in federated learning-based security and privacy
systems.
• We provide an experimental analysis of federated deep
learning with three deep learning approaches, namely,
RNN, CNN, and DNN. For each deep learning model,
we study the performance of centralized and federated learning under three new real IoT traffic datasets,
namely, the Bot-IoT dataset, the MQTTset dataset, and
the TON_IoT dataset.
•

VOLUME 9, 2021

TABLE 2. Acronyms used in this survey.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the federated learning-based security and privacy
systems for several types of IoT applications. In Section III,
we provide the federated learning-based cybersecurity intrusion detection systems. In Section IV, we clearly highlight
the use of federated learning with blockchain for IoT applications. Then, we review vulnerabilities that can be exploited by
138513
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FIGURE 4. Federated learning for IoT networks.

adversaries in federated learning-based security and privacy
systems in Section V. Section VI provides an experimental
analysis of federated deep learning with three deep learning
approaches. Section VII highlight the importance of the study
and discuss the significance of our research on the future
of the IoT and its applications, together with current open
challenges. Lastly, Section VIII presents our conclusions.
II. FEDERATED MACHINE LEARNING APPROACHES FOR
THE IoT APPLICATIONS

Fig 4 shows the federated learning-based cybersecurity for
IoT. Tab. 2 provides the acronyms used in this study. Tab. 3
presents the federated learning-based solution for cybersecurity in IoT applications.
A. DETECTING COMPROMISED IoT DEVICES

IoT devices are being increasingly deployed in the everyday life. Many of those devices, however, are susceptible
to attack through unsafe design, deployment, and configurations. Accordingly, many existing systems already contain
vulnerable IoT devices that are open to being compromised,
which is furthermore harmful in sensitive tasks such as
surveillance, as shown by the work of Ciuonzo et al. [59],
which focused on the issue of distributed detection of a
non-cooperative object in a wireless sensor network.
While centralized learning-based intrusion detection
approaches have been successful, including the hybrid
hierarchical and AutoEncoder techniques, as presented by
138514

Bovenzi et al. [60], which provided a two-tier hierarchical
network-based IDS that performs anomaly detection with
a multimodal deep autoencoder, and soft output classifiers.
And also, the work of Mirsky et al. [61], which provided
Kitsune, a network-based plug-and-play IDS that can efficiently classify attacks on the local network without supervision. However, data privacy, network latency, and similar
centralized learning-based issues are not considered in these
approaches.
To identify compromised IoT devices, Nguyen et al. [57]
proposed an autonomous self-learning distributed scheme,
named DIOT, which is based on a federated learning
approach. The flask and flask socketio libraries are used
during the implementation of the federated learning algorithm. The performance evaluation shows that the DIOT
scheme is able to detect 95.6% of attacks in an average
of 257 milliseconds. Zhao et al. [62] developed a federated
learning-based intrusion detection system, which can be used
for detecting compromised IoT devices. The proposed system proposes that the global initial long short-term memory
model is distributed among all user servers. Then, the user
servers form their own unique model and start uploading
their model settings to the central server. Last, the central
server aggregates the model settings in order to form a new
aggregate global model and then sends it to the user servers.
The results of simulation on the SEA dataset (i.e., produced
by the AT&T Shannon Lab) demonstrate that the proposed
system reaches better accuracy and coherence compared to
VOLUME 9, 2021
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TABLE 3. Federated learning-based solution for cyber security in IoT applications.

the conventional systems. To find the best candidate clients
and solve the issue of accuracy optimization in federated
learning, Mohammed et al. [63] introduced an online stateful
heuristic based on federated learning combined with an IoT
client alarm application, which can be used to notify clients
of any unauthorized IoT devices in the IoT environment. The
results of simulation on a real data set demonstrates that the
suggested system surpasses the online randomized algorithm
with up to 27% gain in terms of accuracy.
VOLUME 9, 2021

B. SECURE INDUSTRIAL INTERNET OF THINGS

With small size, small cost, and limited energy consumption, these appealing capabilities have made Internet of
Things (IoT) largely endorsed in smart factories to supervise
machinery, guide their automatic processes, or to help create
a virtual representation of systems for advanced simulation
purposes using digital twins [64]. To provide the tensor based
data mining while guaranteeing the data security in industrial
internet of things, Kong et al. [65] proposed a framework
138515
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Federated Tensor Mining, named FTM, which is based on
homomorphic encryption methods. The FTM framework is
claimed to achieve high accuracy due to the homomorphic attribution. Khoa et al. [66] presented an IDS based on
collaborative learning which can be applied effectively in
the Industrial IoT and Industry 4.0. The proposed system
builds intelligent ‘‘filters’’ for deployment at IoT gateways to
quickly identify and prevent cyberattacks. Specifically, each
filter utilizes the data collected in a filter’s network in order
to train its model for cyberattack detection through a deep
learning system. Afterward, the trained model is distributed
to other IoT gateways to increase the accuracy of intrusion
detection throughout the overall system.
Rehman et al. [27] proposed an idea to enable a fully
decentralized cross-device federated learning system, named
TrustFed, which uses Industrial IoT devices as federated
learning candidates. To maintain participants’ reputations,
the proposed TrustFed system uses smart contract technology and the Ethereum blockchain. TrustFed can identify and
eliminate outliers in the training distributions prior to combining the model updates. The results of the simulation on the
Turbofan Engine Degradation simulation dataset (released
by NASA) demonstrates that the proposed system performs
better in terms of the lower loss irrespective of the population
size. Sun et al. [47] introduced a new framework based on
digital twin to assist federated learning in Industrial IoT. The
digital twin are used for capturing the characteristics of industrial devices. Hao et al. [58] developed a privacy-enhanced
federated learning system, named PEFL, for industrial artificial intelligence, which is based on Augmented Learning
with Error (A-LWE) term embedded with the homomorphic ciphertext of private gradients. To provide differential privacy, the PEFL system adopts a distributed Gaussian
mechanism. The performance evaluation on MNIST dataset
demonstrates that the PEFL system in terms of accuracy as
well as communication and computation costs. To reduce
the communication burden on the federated learning server,
a proxy server can be used which is proposed Zhao et al. [67]
to achieve anonymity of participants.
C. SECURE EDGE COMPUTING

Newly emerging technologies such as Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) and new generation communication technologies
are essential to support the fast development and deployment of the IoT networks. As IoT networks grow in scale,
determining the optimal allocation of limited resources to
deliver high-quality IoT services is a critical challenge. Edge
computing involves the processing of data at the edge of
a network compared to processing in the cloud or on a
remote server. To provide privacy and data security, Taïk
and Cherkaoui [68] designed a system model based on federated learning and edge computing. The edge devices are
used to train models by federated learning, which can minimize security issues. Lu et al. [53] designed a new system,
named DITEN, that integrating blockchain and federated
learning in edge networks. The proposed DITEN system uses
138516

Deep Neural Networks (DNN) as a strategy scheduler to
ensure data privacy of users and enhance learning security.
The experimental results on two datasets, namely, the realworld MNIST dataset and the Fashion-MNIST show that
the proposed DITEN system is efficient compared to the
conventional federated learning in terms of learning accuracy,
learning loss, and communication time cost. Qian et al. [69]
developed a privacy-preserving data analytic system, where
the federated learning at the centralized fog devices. The
proposed system uses an active learning in edge devices,
which can harvest the potential privacy benefits as well as
reduce latency and communication overhead.
To provide joint IoT network and edge server optimization, Xiao et al. [70] proposed a federated edge intelligence
framework, named FEI. The FEI consists of a group of edge
servers that trains a shared model using the data collected
and uploaded from IoT devices. Cui et al. [71] introduced a
secure and decentralized platform, named SAPE, for securing
edge computing. The SAPE platform enables users to send
their assignments, which are then planned to the relevant
edge nodes to reduce the time it takes to complete the tasks.
To prevent attacks, the SAPE platform uses federated deep
reinforcement learning (DRL). The reliability of the federated
training process is improved by a blockchain-based verification scheme. The findings demonstrate that SAPE overcomes
some of the shortcomings conventional schemes during the
defense against adversarial attacks.
D. SECURE INTERNET OF DRONES

The combination of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
artificial intelligence (AI) technology created opportunities
to facilitate existing ground-based mobile crowdsensing platforms to achieve more difficult missions. More precisely,
drones enable autonomous crowdsensing at any time and
any place due to their remarkable benefits of lower cost,
faster operational deployment, and more flexible movement,
as presented by Motlagh et al. [72], which provided a demonstration of the use of drones for crowd surveillance through
face recognition. Federated learning can provide significant privacy protection by allowing a collection of UAVs
to train a shared AI model collaboratively while preserving the training data (i.e., sensed data) on their devices at
the local level. Fig 5 illustrate the federated learning-based
cybersecurity for internet of drones. For secure and efficient AI model training in UAV-assisted mobile crowdsensing, Wang et al. [25] designed a practical federated learning
framework, named SFAC, which is based on three technologies, namely, blockchain, local differential privacy, and
reinforcement learning. Blockchain technology is used to
preserve data training and contribution verification between
drones, whereas reinforcement learning is used to achieve
optimal strategies. Their performance evaluation using the
MNIST dataset showed that the SFAC framework enhanced
the quality of the local model update (QoLM) metric in
the federated learning process learning, compared with conventional frameworks. To defend against jamming attacks,
VOLUME 9, 2021
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Mowla et al. [73] introduced an adaptive federated reinforcement learning system, which can be applied for flying ad-hoc
networks. The simulation results indicated a 39.9% improved
average accuracy of the federated jamming detection scheme
used in the defense mechanism.
To counteract eavesdropping in a fog-aided IoD network,
Yao et al. [74] proposed a secure federated learning scheme.
The main idea of this proposed scheme is that monitoring
the energy of all the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to
optimize the safety rate of the federated learning system
is limited by the UAV battery capacity and the Quality of
Service (QoS) constraint. The performance evaluation of the
proposed scheme shows that it performs better than two existing related algorithms with a small federated learning training
time. Therefore, Yazdinejadna et al. [75] designed an authentication system based on federated learning using drones’
Radio Frequency (RF) features. The proposed authentication
system uses the Deep Neural Network (DNN) and Homomorphic Encryption (HE). The DNN network is implemented
locally on drones with Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD)
optimization, while the HE system is used to secure model
parameters. From the experimental findings, the proposed
authentication system obtains a high true positive rate when
authenticating drones and improved performances in comparison to alternative machine learning-based systems.

in evaluating and responding to COVID-19 is the effective identification of infected patients, and AI is a key part
of this. However, the problem with the old centralized AI
is the sharing of data among hospitals around the world,
which raises many privacy issues, and that’s where FL comes
in. Zhang et al. [23] proposed a dynamic fusion-based FL
system to analyze medical diagnostic images such as CT
scans and X-rays, and decide dynamically which clients participate according to the performance of their local model
and plan the fusion of models depending on the training
time. The results demonstrated that the system is practical
in terms of performance, communication and failure tolerance. Kumar et al. [21] proposed a blockchain-based FL
system for COVID-19 detection, which was trained and
evaluated on real COVID-19 patient data that was collected
and publicly published from various hospitals with different types of CT scanners, as well as a data normalization strategy. Liu et al. [22] proposed an FL-based model for
learning COVID-19 data. The authors evaluated the performance of popular models, including MobileNet, ResNet18,
and COVIDNet, with and without the FL framework. The
authors concluded that ResNeXt shows the highest efficiency
in images with COVID-19 labels. Whereas, MoblieNet possessed the lowest number of parameters. Hence, the work
suggests that ResNeXt and ResNet18 are selected to be better
for COVID-19 identification among the models used.

E. SECURE INTERNET OF HEALTHCARE THINGS

The management of health has emerged as a major issue
and challenge as new complex types of diseases and symptoms are introduced like COVID-19. Fig 6 present how the
healthcare sector can use federated learning techniques in
order to maintain patients’ data privacy, while benefiting
from other hospitals’ knowledge. Thwal et al. [49] designed a
deep learning-based clinical decision support solution, which
is trained and managed in a federated learning model. The
proposed solution focused on an approach to ensure patients’
privacy and address the threat of cyberattacks by allowing
for the mining of clinical data at a large scale. Based on a
federated learning model, the proposed solution can exploit
rich clinical data to train every local neural network with no
requirement to share patient private data.
To decrease energy consumption in the federated learning process, Hao et al. [76] designed a new scheme, which
separates the model into three sections and transfers the
central section to the cloud server with a high computational cost. To perform gradients aggregation in ciphertext
context, the proposed scheme applies homomorphic encryption, which can resist several existing deep learning privacy
attacks. For securing wearable healthcare, Chen et al. [77]
a federated transfer learning framework, named FedHealth.
The FedHealth framework combines different organizations’
data without losing information privacy and performs comparatively personalized learning of models using transfer of
knowledge.
The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a global crisis that
required collaborative efforts to combat it. A critical factor
VOLUME 9, 2021

F. SECURE CLOUD COMPUTING

While conventional machine learning training models share
data centrally in the cloud, an increasing number of customers
are not interested in participating in data sharing due to
privacy or peer competition issues. Federated learning has
been suggested as a distributed platform to overcome these
limitations, where multiple customers collectively train a
machine learning model without partitioning their individual datasets. Fang et al. [50] designed a federated learning
scheme with strong privacy preservation, named HFWP, for
securing cloud computing. Based on a lightweight encryption protocol, the HFWP scheme is robust against colluding
parties and an honest but curious server. The experimental results on two real-world datasets, namely, MNIST and
UCI Human Activity Recognition Dataset, shows the highest
accuracy compared to other existing works. Zhang et al. [78]
introduced a federated learning scheme that takes the local
characteristics of AI IoT applications, which can enhance
the accuracy of prediction of any individual AI IoT-enabled
device.
For enhancing cloud computing-based 5G heterogeneous network, Wei et al. [79] designed a federated learning
scheme based on end-edge-cloud cooperation. Within this
scheme, the nodes that are equipped with mechanisms for
attack detection are deployed in the end, edge, and cloud
of the 5G heterogeneous network. To reduce the negative
impacts due to heterogeneity in a cloud-edge architecture,
Wu et al. [80] proposed a personalized federated learning
138517
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FIGURE 5. Federated learning for secure internet of drones.

scheme, which the power of edge computing is used for high
throughput and low latency.
G. DATA COLLABORATIONS IN IoTs

As IoT technologies are rapidly emerging, network applications require cross-domain collaborative computational processing, which necessitates the aggregation and cooperation
of a large number of network data sources. Different data
owned by various stakeholders and having distinct properties
will be combined into the network applications within these
processes. The information that is revealed to the providers
of applications, results in the inevitable risks of losing data
privacy control. To enable the secure collaboration of massive
data sources, Yin et al. [81] designed a secure data collaboration scheme, called FDC, which can be applied in an
IoT environment. The FDC scheme uses three parties: a
blockchain system, public data center, and a private data
center. The blockchain system is used to sustain flexibility
and access control, while the private data center is applied for
registration, management, storage, and IoT data collection.
The performance evaluation on wearable sensor data shows
that the proposed FDC scheme provides efficient accuracy
and loss.
H. SECURE 5G-ENABLED IoT

The IoT network environments are time-varying, and the
network devices’ heterogeneous resources make it difficult
138518

to provide reliable, secure, and real-time communications
among the network devices and their service servers, especially in the 5G-enabled IoT. Yu et al. [52] proposed a
federated learning-based distributed model, named UDEC,
in order to address the following three challenges: 1) Privacy
and security-preserving services, 2) Dynamic and low-cost
scheduling, and 3) Full use of system resources. The UDEC
model train deep reinforcement learning to secure critical
users’ service request data at the edge nodes. Their performance evaluation shows the effectiveness of the UDEC model
in terms of energy consumption.
I. SECURE INTERNET OF VEHICLES

Vehicular IoT provides a safer travel environment and better
on-board experience, leading us to a smart and self-driving
automotive future. In particular, there are a number of applications that can be found in the field of automotive IoT,
including, autonomous vehicles, driver assistance, vehicle
telematics, and predictive automotive maintenance. A federated learning approach is implemented in the field of
data-driven navigation, which uses the data that mobile
users collect and embedded processing resources. Fig 7
illustrate the use of federated leaning-based cybersecurity for Internet of Vehicles applications. To address the
challenge of flexibility of participants under a federated
learning-based navigation application, Kong et al. [24] proposed a privacy-preserving model aggregation technique,
VOLUME 9, 2021
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Lu et al. [55] proposed a scheme for federated peer-to-peer
vehicle learning that uses random updating of sub-pots with
no conservators, which increases both safety and reliability.
The process of aggregation is performed in all vehicles in an
asynchronous manner. When performing a joint learning task
that includes data sharing or leak detection, all vehicles act as
participants to perform federated learning. The information
from vehicle data retrieval is stored on neighboring RSUs in
the system in a distributed hash table form.
J. SECURE MOBILE CROWDSENSING

FIGURE 6. Federated learning for secure internet of Healthcare things.

named FedLoc, which can secure updates to locally trained
models, providing robust support for participant fluctuation.
The FedLoc scheme is robust against malicious unauthorized
participants by employing the limited Laplace mechanism as
well as the homomorphic threshold encryption mechanism.
Lu et al. [56] designed a collaborative edge learning framework, named CLONE, by using real-world data set captured
from a large electric vehicle (EV) manufacturing enterprise.
The CLONE framework is based on long-term memory networks and a federated learning algorithm to proves latency
saving, privacy enforcement, safety preservation, and the
efficacy of driver personalization. The CLONE framework
selects the fault of an EV battery and related hardware as
a case study to demonstrate that the CLONE system can
predict failures with accuracy to achieve collaborative and
reliable driving. Lu et al. [55] proposed a scheme for federated peer-to-peer vehicle learning that uses random updating
of sub-pots with no conservators, which increases both safety
and reliability. The process of aggregation is performed in
all vehicles in an asynchronous manner. When performing a
joint learning task that includes data sharing or leak detection,
all vehicles act as participants to perform federated learning.
The information from vehicle data retrieval is stored on neighboring RSUs in the system in a distributed hash table form.
VOLUME 9, 2021

Mobile Crowdsensing is an emerging key element of IoT,
which is a model that employs individuals wearing smart
devices, called ‘‘workers’’, to conduct different sensing activities. To resolve two challenges for mobile crowdsensing,
namely, user dropout and forced aggregation, Liu et al. [54]
proposed a federated extreme gradient boosting framework,
named FEDXGB, which is based on two kinds of parts,
a central cloud server and a set of users. FEDXGB performs
the following process. The central server takes an iterative
invocation of a sequence of secure schemes to construct
the XGBoost classification and regression tree. Within the
schemes, the FEDXGB framework uses a secure aggregation
protocol to aggregate user gradients. Through a combination of Bresson’s cryptosystem and Shamir’s secret sharing,
FEDXGB allows the central server to perform constrained
aggregation on the gradients and is able to recover dropout
users’ data. The performance evaluation under both ADULT
and MNIST datasets show that the FEDXGB framework can
provide a computation and communication cost reduction
with negligible performance loss.
The data aggregation techniques based on homomorphic
encryption for privacy-preserving have been well-studied
for improving the privacy of FL systems. Zhang et al. [82]
proposed a secure data aggregation system, named FedSky,
for federated mobile crowdsensing, which is based on an
effective worker selection mechanism. Instead of choosing
a random cluster of users, The FedSky system chooses a
cluster of users based on the size of the users’ local data and
the computing power of their mobile devices. Compared to
the conventional FedAvg approach [83], the proposed system
can reduce significantly the computation time of the users as
well as the latency of the system. The performance evaluation
on the MNIST dataset shows that the proposed system the
maximum training time can be as high as 6 hours under
the experimental setting of sd = 15 and k = 100 (sd: the
standard deviation for computational power; k: the number
of selected workers).
K. CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

Cyber physical systems process multi-source and large-scale
data in various domains of application. These data are generally composed of private personal and incomplete information, usually distributed across various devices and locations.
Federated learning is proposed as an efficient approach for
ensuring the privacy of cyber physical systems. Based on a
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FIGURE 7. The application of federated learning approach for secure internet of vehicles.

Gaussian mechanism and an optimized federated soft-impute
algorithm, Yang et al. [48] introduced a privacy-preserving
tensor completion method. Through a formal recovery error
bound, the proposed privacy-preserving tensor completion
method is proven that can provide a privacy guarantee with
high accuracy.
III. FEDERATED LEARNING-BASED CYBER SECURITY
INTRUSION DETECTION

Tab. 4 presents the federated learning-based systems for intrusion and malware detection in IoT applications.
A. FEDERATED LEARNING-BASED ANOMALY DETECTION

Federated learning is a decentralized machine learning
approach that exploits the performance computing power of
edge devices with no explicit exchange of user data patterns.
The local models are trained on user data on the device, and
those models are forwarded to a central server. Since it is
trained on sensitive user data, federated learning can suffer
from machine learning attacks against the locally created
models. To overcome this problem, Al-Marri et al. [89] proposed an IDS based on federated mimic learning. The proposed system is implemented and evaluated using Python on
Google Colab with the real-world dataset (NSL-KDD), which
the results show 98.11% detection accuracy with federated
mimic learning compared to centralized machine learningbased IDSs. To address the need for securing traffic and
maintaining privacy in heterogeneous networks, Li et al. [90]
designed a distributed an IDS based on federated learning
for satellite-terrestrial integrated networks for analyzing and
138520

blocking harmful traffic, especially distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. The proposed IDS uses two technologies, namely, 1) homomorphic encryption to provide secure
multi-party computing in federated learning and 2) convolutional neural network for achieving higher recognition
accuracy.
To detecting various types of cyber threats against industrial cyber physical systems, Li et al. [92] designed an IDS
based on federated learning with a convolutional neural network and a gated recurrent unit. The proposed IDS system
employs the Paillier public-key cryptosystem to ensure that
the model parameters remain secure and private throughout the training process. The performance evaluation under
the gas pipeline system dataset show the following results:
F-score = 98.14 %, recall = 97.47 %, precision = 98.85 %,
accuracy = 99.20 %, which are better compared to three
related works [57], [95], and [77]. Mothukuri et al. [85] uses
Gated Recurrent Units (GRUs) models-based anomaly detection approach to provide real-time proactive recognition
of intrusions in IoT networks through the use of decentralized device data. The proposed IDS can preserve the
integrity of data stored on local IoT devices by sharing only
the weights learned with the federated learning’s central
server. Huong et al. [86] designed an IDS, named LocKedge,
for IoT networks. The LocKedge system uses the detection
task right at the edge layer with high accuracy. Therefore,
the detection system is based on two modules: feature extraction and classification. The feature extraction stage focuses
on minimizing features from the input samples that are fed
to the detection stage. The performance evaluation under the
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TABLE 4. Federated learning-based systems for intrusion and malware detection in IoT applications.
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BoT-IoT dataset shows that federated learning results are
lower than its centralized mode counterpart. Chen et al. [94]
proposed a federated deep autoencoding Gaussian mixture
model, named FDAGMM, for network anomaly detection.
Through the performance evaluation under the use of the network intrusion detection dataset (KDDCUP 99), the results
show that the FDAGMM model is efficient in three metrics,
including, F1-Score, Precision, and Recall, compared to the
deep autoencoding gaussian mixture model.
Based on the performing inference of detection models
and local training, Rahman et al. [91] proposed a federated
learning-based system for detecting IoT intrusion, which can
preserve data privacy. Therefore, the IoT devices can take
advantage of the knowledge of their peers by sharing only the
updates to a remote server. Then, the remote server aggregates
the updates and exchanges an enhanced detection framework
with the collaborating devices. The performance evaluation
on an NSL-KDD dataset shows that the proposed system have
an accuracy fluctuating around 83.09 %. Cetin et al. [96] proposed an IDS, named FedAGRU, which is based on federated
learning. For collaborative training, FedAGRU takes advantage of the computing resources of edge devices and local
datasets for training the model and then uploads the settings
to a server. Through the performance evaluation under the
use of the three network intrusion detection dataset, namely,
KDD CUP 99 data set, CICIDS2017 data set, and WSN-DS
wireless network data set, the results show that the FedAGRU
system provides less communication overhead with higher
detection accuracy. McElwee et al. [97] proposed a federated
analysis security triage tool, named FASTT, for prioritizing
and responding to IDS alerts. The FASTT tool resolves the
issue of the high volume of intrusion detection threats that
need to be reviewed by security analysts in a manual process.
Based on the TensorFlow deep neural network approach,
the FASTT can categorize intrusion detection alerts and identify which types of security analysts are to review the threats.
To construct a generalized model for anomaly detection
in the industrial internet of things, Wang et al. [28] proposed
hierarchical federated learning, where every local model is
trained by deep reinforcement learning algorithm. As the
local datasets are not needed during federated learning,
the privacy leakage risk is minimized. Moreover, through
injecting a degree of privacy leakage and an interaction function into the anomaly detection concept, the proposed system
can significantly increase the accuracy of detection.
Based on a boosting method of logistic model trees,
Cvitic et al. [29] proposed a DDoS traffic detection for different IoT device classes. For collecting federated data from
heterogeneous sources in IoT networks, Moustafa et al. [98]
introduced the testbed TON IoT datasets for Windows operating systems, which is deployed in three layers: edge, fog,
and cloud. The edge layer includes IoT devices, the Fog layer
includes gateways and virtual machines, and the cloud layer
includes cloud services, connected to the other two layers.
Therefore, the TON IoT datasets employed under the following nine attack families: 1) Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)
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attack, 2) Password attack, 3) Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
attack, 4) Injection attack, 5) Backdoor attack, 6) Ransomware attack, 7) Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attack, 8) Denial of Service (DoS) attack, and 9) Scanning attack. To provide wireless edge network security
in IoT networks, Chen et al. [88] proposed a federated
learning-based intrusion detection system, named FedAGRU,
which employs gated recurrent units (GRUs) models. Specifically, the proposed FedAGRU system is different from
the existing centralized learning approaches by providing
updates to the global learning models rather than sharing the
original data directly between the central server and edge
devices. Based on three datasets, namely, KDD CUP 99 data
set, CICIDS2017 data set, and WSN-DS wireless network
data set, the results demonstrate that FedAGRU increases
the accuracy of detection by around 8% compared to other
centralized learning approaches. Moreover, the cost of communication of FedAGRU achieves 70%, which is lower performance than other federated learning approaches.
B. FEDERATED LEARNING-BASED MALWARE DETECTION

There are billions of IoT devices without suitable protection
measures which have been developed and deployed in the last
few years. The susceptibility of these devices to malware has
increased the requirement for effective detection technologies to identify devices that are compromised by malware
inside the network. Taheri et al. [87] proposed an federated
learning-based system, named Fed-IIoT, for android malware
detection. To impersonate the environment of a poisoned
sample, the Fed-IIoT system employs a generative adversarial
network. The performance evaluation on three IoT datasets
(the Contagio dataset, Drebin dataset, and Genome dataset)
using different features show that the Fed-IIoT system performs significantly better than other local adversarial training mechanisms. To perform malware detection in cloud
computing environments, Payne and Kundu [93] proposed a
hierarchical approach towards deep federated defences. Their
proposed approach formalized malware detection as a graph
and hypergraph learning problem.
IV. FEDERATED LEARNING WITH BLOCKCHAIN

Blockchain is a decentralized, provenance-preserving,
immutable ledger technique. It provides an efficient method
to remove a central server that is prone to attacks in an
untrusted computing environment [110], [111]. To alleviate
the security problems that involve a central server in federated
learning, the blockchain model can be integrated with the
federated learning as shown in Fig 8 [112]–[118]. Tab. 5
presents works on blockchain and federated learning-based
solutions for cyber security in IoT applications.
A. PERMISSIONED BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTIONS

The implementation of distributed multi-party data sharing
in IoT applications is challenged by several issues. Based
on permissioned blockchain, Lu et al. [106] developed a differential private multi-party data model sharing mechanism,
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TABLE 5. Blockchain and federated learning-based solutions for cyber security in IoT applications.

which is combined with federated learning. The proposed
mechanism can reduce the threat of data leakage, which
enables data owners to have more control over the access
to stored and shared data. The simulation results on two
real-world data sets (i.e., Reuters dataset and 20 newsgroups
dataset) show that the proposed system can guarantee the
quality of shared data as well as differential privacy.
To enhance the security of federated learning, Majeed and
Hong [107] developed a blockchain-based solution, named
FLchain, which can be applied in multi-access edge computing. The FLchain solution uses two ideas, namely, 1) the
channels for learning multiple global models and 2) the global
model state tree. Specifically, the aggregation of local model
updates is updated and stored in the blockchain network.
VOLUME 9, 2021

Połap et al. [104] developed a privacy-preserving federated learning scheme, which is based on blockchain technology for securing the Internet of Medical Things. The
use of the blockchain technology here provides security to
updates of local data, which are critical for the aggregation of
federated learning, and are derived from trusted devices with
authenticity. Furthermore, the local updates can be stored
as transactions in the blockchain network. The simulation
results on the Tuberculosis Chest X-ray Image Data Sets with
a convolutional neural network as a learning classifier show
that the proposed scheme achieves an effectiveness average
of 73,7%. Based on a multi-agent system, Połap et al. [99]
developed a security architecture that combines the implementation of blockchain technology and federated learning
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FIGURE 8. Federated learning with Blockchain.

for securing the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT). The
proposed architecture enables separating specific tasks to
agents units as well as sharing and protecting private data
using blockchain technology. The performance evaluation on
Skin Cancer MNIST dataset with the ratio of 70:30 between
training and validating shows that the proposed architecture
achieved an accuracy of 80 % for 25 iteration.
Lugan et al. [108] introduced a scalable security architecture by deriving a new paradigm of trusted coalitions
with a high degree of trustworthiness which provides
privacy-preserving of data as well as motivation for coalition participation in the absence of a central authority. The
proposed architecture is based on permissioned blockchains,
which enable deep learning that is distributed with rising
degrees of security and privacy. Lu et al. [18] proposed a permissioned blockchain empowered federated learning scheme,
using digital twins to support long-distance communication
between edge servers and end users in edge computing. The
performance evaluations on the CIFAR10 dataset show that
the learning loss of the proposed scheme is improved through
the optimization process.
Through a shared machine learning model,
Doku et al. [109] proposed a federated learning scheme,
138524

named iFLBC, which is based on blockchain technology.
The iFLBC scheme generates a shared model based on the
aggregation of the trained models. The aggregated model
is then used by IoT users to provide edge intelligence to
end users. The Proof of Common Interest (PoCI) is used by
the iFLBC scheme as a consensus algorithm to determine
relevant data.
To perform authentication and trust management of
federated nodes as well as the edge training model,
Rahman et al. [103] introduced a hybrid lightweight federated learning platform that uses smart blockchain contracts
for securing the Internet of Health Things (IoHT). Their platform is designed to enable inference process model learning,
and the complete encryption of a dataset. Here a blockchain is
used to aggregate the updated model parameters using multiplicative encryption, while the additive encryption operation
is performed by each federated edge node.
Through a shared machine learning model,
Doku et al. [109] proposed a federated learning scheme,
named iFLBC, which is based on blockchain technology.
The iFLBC scheme generates a shared model based on the
aggregation of the trained models. The aggregated model is
then used by IoT users for the provision of edge intelligence
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to end-users. The Proof of Common Interest (PoCI) is used
by the iFLBC scheme as a consensus algorithm to determine
relevant data.
B. PERMISSIONLESS BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTIONS

The permissionless blockchains (aka. public blockchains)
enable any person to perform operations and to join as a
validator. Li et al. [100] introduced a crowdsourcing protocol, called CrowdSFL, which is based on federated learning and blockchain technology. The CrowdSFL protocol
uses a re-encryption algorithm based on Elgamal to provide higher security with less overhead. The simulation
results show that the proposed CrowdSFL protocol can resist
the following malicious behaviors: Malicious miners, Malicious workers, and Malicious requesters. To resist poisoning
attacks as well as membership inference attacks in 5G networks, Liu et al. [101] developed a blockchain-based federated learning protocol. The proposed protocol can provide
privacy-preserving of data based on the local differential
privacy technology. The performance evaluation using two
datasets, including, MNIST dataset and CIFAR-10 dataset,
show that the proposed protocol can deter poisoning attacks.
Wang et al. [102] proposed a secure decentralized multiparty learning scheme, named BEMA, for edge computingbased IoT applications. Specifically, each part in the BEMA
scheme distributes their local model and during that time,
they are processing the models received from other users
about their local dataset and identify the models that require
certification. According the BEMA scheme, the parties
broadcasts the certification message to the corresponding parties. Based on the certification message, the system parties are
not required to exchange their dataset with any other parties.
The simulation results on the MNIST dataset show that the
BEMA scheme is efficient in term of prediction accuracy
under attacks compared to the baseline models.
Based on the features of blockchain technology and federated learning, Sharma et al. [105] proposed a distributed
computing defence scheme for securing the Internet of Battle
Things. The proposed system is composed of four different
layers: data layer, edge layer, fog layer, and cloud layer.
The performance evaluation shows that the proposed scheme
achieved an accuracy rate of more than 92.7 %.
V. THREAT MODELS IN FEDERATED LEARNING

As federated learning is based on the collaborative action of
all edge devices to build a machine learning model, a machine
learning model can be faked when only a couple of edge
devices are operating incorrectly [137]. Tab. 6 presents the
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries in federated learning-based systems for IoT networks.
A. INFORMATION LEAKAGE

The problem of information leakage from collaborative deep
learning is addressed by Hitaj et al. [120], where the authors
proposed an attack to leverage the real-time quality of the
learning operation which enables the adversary to train a
VOLUME 9, 2021

generative adversary network (GAN) to create a set of targeted training patterns designed to be protected from the
adversary. Based on the analysis of the privacy leakage
of TernGrad [138], Dong et al. [51] proposed a secure and
robust federated learning protocol, named EaSTFLy, which
can be applied in IoT networks. The EaSTFLy protocol
uses privacy-preserving technologies, namely, Paillier homomorphic encryption (PHE) and Shamir’s threshold secret
sharing (TSS) in order to solve arising privacy issues. The
performance evaluation shows that the EaSTFLy protocol
can resist against semi-honest adversaries using two datasets,
including, MNIST and SVHN.
To train a deep neural network over a large dataset can consume significant time and resources. One popular approach
to scaling is to fragment the training dataset, and simultaneously train different networks on each of these subsets and
then share settings via a server of metrics. When training,
a local model retrieves settings from the server, computes any
required changes from its existing training dataset, and then
sends these changes directly back to the server, which makes
changes to the overall settings. Melis et al. [136] founded that
the leakage of unintended features will expose collaborative
learning to powerful inference attacks.
B. POISONING ATTACK

Poisoning attacks focus on degrading the accuracy of
a machine learning model by falsifying the aggregation
through the use of poisoned model updates, as shown in
Fig 9. Tan et al. [137] categorized poisoning attacks using
the sources of poisoned model updates into two types,
namely, model poisoning and data poisoning. Data poisoning is performed by changing the training data in the
damaged edge devices, while model poisoning uses some
predefined rules to generates updates to the poisoned model.
Zhao et al. [127] proposed a defense security system against
poisoning attacks using the concept of generative adversarial networks. The proposed system removes adversaries
using auditing data that is generated by generative adversarial
networks. Based on microaggregation and Gaussian mixture models, Singh et al. [126] designed a security system,
where the clients of the system self-identify as members
of a minority group and advertise relevant features to their
peers. Even with a low proportion of malicious edge servers,
data poisoning attacks can significantly decrease recall and
classification accuracy, as discussed by Tolpegin et al. [139].
Fang et al. [125] proposed a new idea to defend against the
local model poisoning attacks based on two concepts, including, Reject on Negative Impact (RONI) and TRIM. The
RONI consists of evaluates the influence of every training instance on the learned model’s error rate and deletes
the training instances that have a significant negative influence. Ma et al. [128] proposed a secure federated learning
mechanism based on the trimmed optimization with multiple keys, which can resist a range of poisoning attacks.
Taheri et al. [87] uses two concepts, including, Federated
Generative Adversarial Network (FedGAN) and Generative
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TABLE 6. The vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries in federated learning-based systems for IoT networks.
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FIGURE 9. Poisoning attack in federated learning.

Adversarial Network (GAN), to create an architecture based
on federated learning, named called Fed-IIoT. The proposed
Fed-IIoT architecture can resist dynamic poisoning attacks in
the server-side components.
C. JAMMING ATTACK

Adversaries can initiate a jamming attack against federated learning-based security and privacy systems where
the intruder’s intention is to maliciously interrupt the victim network’s conversation by interfering or colliding at
the recipient’s side. Mowla et al. [129] proposed a security
architecture using federated learning for the detection of cognitive jamming attack. Based on the Dempster–Shafer theorybased client group prioritization technique, the detection can
be performed on the device while taking into account the
unbalanced sensory data characteristics of the environment
under training.

Qiu et al. [124] proposed an adversarial attack against deep
learning-based network intrusion detection systems to attack
one state-of-the-art Kitsune [61]. The proposed attack uses
saliency maps to identify the critical features. Therefore,
Ibitoye et al. [121] showed the impact of adversarial samples
on an intrusion detection system based on a deep learning
approach in the environment of an IoT network. Specifically, the study uses two deep learning approaches, including, a typical Feed-forward Neural Network (FNN) and a
Self-normalizing Neural Network (SNN). The performance
results on the BoT-IoT dataset show that an intrusion detection system based on an FNN performs better than with SNN.
The concept of Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)
was introduced by Goodfellow et al. [142], which is used by
Hassan et al. [122] to generate adversarial attack data and
attempting to classify these generated data. The GAN is
composed of two components, including, 1) generator and
2) discriminator. Fig 10 illustrate GAN with FL-based IoT
for cyber security [143]. To improve the reliability of the
attack/non-attack detection system for a non-noisy as well as
an adversarial setting, the authors proposed a robust decision
boundary optimization approach. To train the downsampler,
the proposed system uses a novel cooperative training algorithm, which provides an improved delivery for noisy examples with the real distribution. Throughout the performance
evaluation on a SCADA dataset, the results show that the
proposed system can classify with a binary cross-entropy loss
score of 0.47 and an accuracy of 95.55 %.
Recently, Rosenberg et al. [144] proposed a taxonomy for
the adversarial attacks in cyber security based on the following seven distinct attack characteristics:

D. BYZANTINE ATTACK

An attacker distributes a local malicious model to other participants to modify the result of the classification of the maxmodel predictor. This attacker can induce errors in their local
model update process. Wang et al. [102] designed a secure
federated learning system based on blockchain technology
that can defend against Byzantine attacks. Jebreel et al. [130]
designed a novel concept against Byzantine attacks where the
basic concept is the analysis of a small fraction of the updates,
instead of analyzing the whole updates. Sun et al. [47] proposed adaptive federated learning with digital twin, which
is based on the concept of interaction records and learning
quality that rely on the use of malicious updates to mitigate
the malicious data threat.

•

•
•

•

•

E. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK

When an adversary is able to compromise an IoT device
without being detected, it can attempt to ‘‘poison’’ the system’s training operation by falsifying packets as adversarial
samples that are designed to influence the model’s learning
in a manner that prevents the malicious activity from being
detected [140], [141]. Hitaj et al. [120] uses the differential
privacy at different granularities against generative adversarial network. Song et al. [123] proposed federated defense
against adversarial attacks using deep neural networks.
VOLUME 9, 2021

•

•

Attack’s output: It indicates two types of attacks that aim
to modify a feature’s values, including, feature vector
attack and end-to-end attack.
Perturbed features: This characteristic of the attack consists of the features being added or modified.
Attacker’s goals: This characteristic of the attack consists of performing incorrectly the security goals such
as authentication, confidentiality, privacy, integrity, and
availability. . . etc.
Attack’s targeting: It indicates three types, including,
label indiscriminate attack, label-targeted attack, and
feature-targeted attack.
Attacker’s training set access: It indicates the type of
the adversary’s access to the training set used by the
classifier.
Attacker’s knowledge: This characteristic of the attack
is based on the amount of knowledge of the attacker
regarding the classifier.
Targeted phase: It indicates two phases, including, training phase attack and inference phase attack.

F. PRIVACY LEAKAGE ATTACK

In a distributed learning approach, the parameters of an
updated local model on IoT devices can keep disclosing some
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FIGURE 10. Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) with FL-based IoT for cyber security.

items with extreme ratings to increase or decrease their popularity. Jiang et al. [131] proposed a new idea about designing four features from the gradient matrices in order to
detect shilling attackers. Specifically, the proposed idea train
a semi-supervised Bayes classifier. The performance evaluation on two real-world datasets, namely, MovieLens and
Netflix, demonstrates that the proposed idea can not only
identify shilling hackers but also improve the performance of
recommendations significantly.
H. INFERENCE ATTACK

FIGURE 11. Privacy leakage attack in federated learning.

information regarding data that has been employed during
training. Furthermore, the attackers can deduce if an IoT
device has been involved in some mission from their local
model updates via differential attacks. As each task has specified detection positions, the privacy of the location of the IoT
devices involved can be leaked. To resist against such privacy
leakage attack, Wang et al. [25] proposed a framework that
uses three technologies, namely, blockchain, local differential
privacy, and reinforcement learning. Fig 11 illustrates a privacy leakage attack in federated learning where a malicious
actor compromises the aggregation server and leaks the data
of participating entities.
G. SHILLING ATTACK

Shill attackers attempt to affect recommendation systems by
producing many malicious profile users and rating target
138528

An inference attack is a technique of data mining that is
conducted by examining data to obtain illegitimate knowledge regarding a specific topic or database. Hao et al. [58]
proposed a privacy-enhanced federated learning scheme that
can ensure the privacy of training data during and after the
training process as well as resist model inversion attacks
and membership inference attacks. Liu et al. [54] proposed
a federated extreme gradient boosting scheme that is based
on differential privacy and homomorphism of the Paillier
cryptosystem against the inference attack. Liu et al. [101]
proposed secure federated learning for detection poisoning
and membership inference attacks using the local differential
privacy technology.
I. OTHER ATTACKS

There are other offensive strategies that can be used to attack
ML models, such as white/black-box attacks, or even graybox attacks. The black-box attacks only provide the ability to
query the network’s output or even have no network knowledge, while white-box attacks suppose that the attack target is
available [119]. Gray box attacks train a generative model to
produce adversarial examples and assume only access to the
target model in the training phase [134], [135]. These three
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methods are generally categorized as adversarial attacking
methods.
VI. EXPERIMENTATION

We train three deep federated learning-based IDS models for cyber attack detection in IoT, namely Deep Neural
Network (DNN)-based IDS model, Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN)-based IDS model and Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)-based IDS model. Then, we compare the results
with the classic/centralized versions of machine learning
(non-federated learning).
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

We performed our experiments on Google Colaboratory
using well-known libraries, including NumPy, Pandas, TensorFlow, and Keras. There are different open-source federated
learning frameworks that can be used for simulating and
experimenting the federated learning algorithms, including,
1) Federated Learning and Differential Privacy (FL&DP)
framework (developed by Sherpa.AI), 2) PySyft (developed
by OpenMined), 3) Paddle Federated Learning (PFL) (developed by Baidu), 4) Federated AI Technology Enabler (FATE)
(developed by Webank’s AI department), and 5) TensorFlow
Federated (TFF) (developed by Google Inc.). We chose the
Sherpa.AI framework for its advantages compared to other
frameworks [145]. The source code for the experimental
evaluation of this article is available upon request.1

FIGURE 12. The architecture of our federated deep learning-based IoT
intrusion detection system.

1) FEDERATED LEARNING PROCESS

In Fig 12 we illustrate the learning process applied in our
deep federated learning based-IDS model. Alg. 1 shows a
pseudo-algorithm for the steps taken to train the various client
sets, which is adapted from [9]. At the beginning, a C fraction
of K clients is picked by the aggregation server to join the
FL workflow, and carry out computations for R federated
learning rounds. The aggregation server produces a random
generic model having a random set of initial weights w. Next,
each client k retrieves the generic model from the aggregation
server. Every client re-train the generic model with its private
data locally and calculate a new local set of weights wkt+1
for the freshly generated local model. The clients share the
updated model.
the server aggregates the parameters of
P Then,
nk k
w
all clients ( K
k=1 n t+1 ). After that, the aggregation server
sends the updated global model to the clients, where each
client applies the updated parameters, to improve the global
model. These steps are repeated until the model is converged.

Algorithm 1: Federated Averaging
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
3
5
6
7
8
9
10

Server (K , C, R):
w1 ← GenericModel()
for t = 1, .., R do
St ← Subset(max(C · K , 1), ‘‘random’’)
Parallel.for k ∈ St do
wkt+1 ← Client(wt , k)
end
P
nk k
wt+1 ← K
k=1 n wt+1
end
Client (w, k):
B ← Split(P, B)
for i = 1, .., E do
for b ∈ B do
w ← w − η∇f (w, b)
end
end
Send w to Server

B. DATASETS DESCRIPTION AND PRE-PROCESSING

Datasets are mandatory for training and evaluating IDSs in
IoT networks. The selection of the appropriate datasets for
a specific task is also of great importance. The datasets that
can be used in the performance evaluation of FL approaches
for IoT networks are reviewed in Tab. 7. There are three
datasets, namely, MNIST [146], Fed. EMNIST [147], and
1 https://github.com/Ferrag/FLCYBERSECURITYIOT
VOLUME 9, 2021

CIFAR-10 [151] that can be used as real object classification tasks for evaluating adaptive FL for Industrial IoT.
Therefore, these datasets are not suitable for evaluating
federated learning-based IoT intrusion detection systems.
Security researchers use cyber security datasets such as
NSL-KDD [152] and CICIDS 2017-2018 [153] for the
138529

M. A. Ferrag et al.: Federated Deep Learning for Cyber Security in IoT

TABLE 7. Datasets that can be used in the performance evaluation of FL approaches for IoT networks.
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TABLE 8. Datasets description for experimental evaluation.

performance evaluation of federated learning-based intrusion
detection systems [159]. These two datasets does not contain
IoT and IIoT traffic. In addition, NSL-KDD [152] is obsolete
in the age of IoT networks (i.e., Fog, Edge, Cloud, Virtualization, 6G. . . etc.). For evaluating FL-based cyber security solutions in IoT networks, the security research community uses
the following three datasets: TON_IoT [149], Bot-IoT [154],
and MQTTset [156]. They are chosen specifically because
they are build from heterogeneous data sources as well as
collected from IoT and IIoT sensor telemetry datasets.
FL-based tasks require the data distribution to be
Non-Independent and Identically Distributed (Non-IID) and
unbalanced, which reflects the properties of the real-world
scenario. However, due to the lack of FL-specific datasets,
any pre-existing public dataset with engineered partitions
can be used to mimic data federations, as employed in our
experiment. Based on the datasets review presented in Tab. 7,
we selected and used three real traffic IoT-based datasets,
namely: BoT-IoT dataset, MQTTset dataset, and TON_IoT
dataset. Tab. 8 provides a list of flow types and sample
counts for each dataset. Description and pre-processing of
each dataset is as follows:
1) BoT-IoT DATASET

The BoT-IoT dataset was produced at the Cyber Range Lab
at UNSW Canberra as a result of building a real-life network environment integrating a mix of normal and botnet
traffic [154], [160]–[164]. All 69.3 GB captured PCAP files
with over 72 million records. The dataset is available in
a variety of file formats, including PCAP, generated argus
files, as well as CSV files. We used the CSV files for our
experimental evaluations. The dataset includes various types
of cyber attacks including:
• DDoS & DoS attacks: The purpose of these attacks is to
make services inaccessible to legitimate users by using
a group of compromised bot-nets. Both DDoS, DoS
for TCP and UDP attacks were carried out using the
Hping3 tool.
VOLUME 9, 2021

Reconnaissance: or probing attacks, which is a type
of malicious behavior that collects user data by scanning remote systems. The dataset contains two types
of such attacks, namely: port scanning using Hping3,
and operating system fingerprinting using Nmap and
Xprobe2 tools.
• Theft: The objective of these cyber attacks is to compromise sensitive data. The dataset contains two types of
such attacks, namely Keylogging and Data theft attacks,
both of which are carried out using the Metasploit framework.
After dropping missing values, we also dropped the ’pkSeqID’, ’saddr’, ’sport’, and ’daddr’ features in order to prevent
overfitting, we encoded the ’proto’ feature’ with one-hot
encoding. Then, we normalized other numerical features with
the Z-Score normalization strategy as follows:
x−µ
(1)
z=
σ
where, x denote the value of the feature, µ denote the mean,
and σ denote the standard deviation.
•

2) MQTTset DATASET

introduced by Vaccari et al. [156] to address the lack of
support for specific protocols that IoT environments are
currently using. It consists of Message Queue Telemetry
Transport (MQTT) protocol-based traffic between various
IoT devices to imitate a smart IoT environment. It comprises
real-world attacks tailored to target the IoT environment,
including:
• DoS: This attack was conducted using the MQTTmalaria tool
• Brute Force: The approach to this type of attack is to try
to recover the user credentials used by MQTT using the
MQTTSA tool.
• Malformed data: this type of attack is designed to trigger
several malformed packets and send them to the broker,
attempting to raise exceptions on the selected service.
• SlowITe: the Slow DoS against IoT Environments attack
is a new DoS approach that targets the MQTT protocol,
which generates a huge number of connections to the
MQTT broker.
• MQTT Publish Flood: This approach seeks to overload
the system by using a unique connection rather than
instantiating multiple connections using the IoT-Flock
tool.
3) TON_IoT DATASET

This dataset is introduced by the IoT Lab of the UNSW
Canberra Cyber, the School of Engineering and Information technology (SEIT), UNSW Canberra at the Australian
Defence Force Academy (ADFA) [150] for the collection and
analysis of mixed data sources from IoT and Industrial IoT
(IIoT). The benchmark was conducted using several virtual
machines that included multiple operating systems to address
the cross-layer connectivity between the three tiers: IIoT,
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TABLE 9. Settings for deep learning classifiers.

Cloud, and Edge/Fog systems. Parallel processing was used
to assemble the datasets to gather diverse benign and attack
traffic, for IoT telemetry data service. It includes different
attacking techniques, such as:
•

•

•
•
•

Password Cracking: This type of attack is intended to
allow the attacker to overcome authentication schemes
in order to compromise the IIoT devices. It was conducted using CeWL and Hydra toolkits.
Backdoor: With this kind of attack, it is possible for
attackers to obtain non-authorized remote access to IIoT
devices affected by a backdoor malware. The framework
used for these attacks is the Metasploitable3 framework.
Injection: With this attack, the adversary aims to inject
malicious data into the IIoT applications.
XSS: the adversary frequently tries to run malicious
commands in IIoT applications through a web server.
Scanning: scanning tools, such as Nmap and Nessus
tools, allow the attacker to perform scanning attacks
against the IoT/IIoT devices and MQTT broker in a
public network.

We used three sets of client distributions: K = 5, K = 10,
and K = 15, with two data distribution methods: 1) independent and identically distributed (IID) and 2) non-independent
and identically distributed (Non-IID), over 50 federated
learning rounds. Tab. 9 shows the different parameters used
in the three deep learning models for the centralized and
federated learning approaches.
When conducting intrusion detection performance analysis, the most common metrics used are:
•
•
•
•
•

TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN

To prevent overfitting, we dropped the ’date’ and ’saddr’
features. Then, we used the Z-Score normalization strategy
for numerical features.
•

C. USE CASES AND PERFORMANCE METRICS

For the purpose of evaluating our experiment, we employed
two use cases, namely:
•

•

Centralized learning approach: The data is located at
a single location with three well-known deep learning
classifiers, i.e., DNN, CNN, and RNN.
Federated learning approach: The data is located across
different clients, and an aggregation server is used to
aggregate the models of the clients. We used also the
same classifiers as in the previous approach.

138532

True Positive (TP): is used to determine the number of
attack patterns that are properly classified as attacks.
False Positive (FP): is used to determine the number of
normal patterns that are wrongly classified as attacks.
True Negative (TN): is used to determine the number of
normal patterns that are proportion classified as normal.
False Negative (FN): is used to determine the number of
attack patterns that are wrongly classified as normal.
Accuracy: is used to determine the proportion of correct
classifications to the total number of entries, which is
given by:

Precision: denotes the proportion of correct intrusion
classes to the total amount of predicted intrusion results,
which can be given by:
TP
TP + FP

•

(2)

(3)

Recall: denotes the proportion of proper attack classifications relative to the overall count of all samples that
ought to have been identified as attacks, it is given by:
TP
TP + FN

(4)
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TABLE 10. The evaluation results of centralized learning approaches.

•

F1 -Score: reports the Harmonic Mean between Precision and Recall, which is given by:
2·

Precision · Recall
Precision + Recall

(5)

D. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

The outcomes achieved from both experimental use cases are
as follows:
1) CENTRALIZED LEARNING MODELS

Fig 13 presents the accuracy of deep learning techniques
(DNN, CNN, and RNN) in multiclass classification for the
three datasets (Bot-IoT, MQTTset, and TON_IoT). The highest accuracy for the Bot-IoT dataset was obtained using the
RNN classifier which achieved 96.76%, while the lowest
accuracy was obtained using the DNN classifier with 95.76%.
For the MQTTset dataset, the highest accuracy was obtained
using the DNN classifier which achieved 90.06%, while the

lowest accuracy was obtained using the RNN classifier with
89.29%. The highest accuracy for the TON_IoT dataset was
obtained using the RNN classifier which achieved 99.98%,
while the lowest accuracy was obtained using the CNN classifier with 98.87%.
Tab. 10 provides the obtained centralized model results
of deep learning techniques in terms of Precision, Recall,
and F1 -score under multi-class classification, which reports
the performance of the different models against the different
benign and attack classes in the three datasets.
Fig 14 presents the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for five classes in the BoT-IoT dataset,
namely: class DDoS, class DoS, class Benign, class Reconnaissance, and class Theft. All values are between 0.99 and
1.00. Fig 15 presents the ROC curves for five classes in the
MQTTset dataset, namely: class Bruteforce, class DoS, class
Flood, class Benign, and class Slowite. All values are between
0.94 and 0.98. Fig 16 presents the ROC curves for five classes
in the TON_IoT dataset, namely: class Backdoor, class Injection, class Benign, class Password, and class Scanning.
2) FEDERATED LEARNING MODELS

FIGURE 13. Centralized model performance.
VOLUME 9, 2021

In this experimental setup rather than locating all data in one
location and conducting the learning from there, a federated
deep learning approach is used, where the data never leaves
the client side along with the shared knowledge that goes back
and forth between the aggregation server and the participating
clients.
Fig 17 report the validation accuracy for each global model
against the centralized model across all datasets and all classifiers. Fig 17 (a) plots the validation accuracy achieved by
the federated deep learning classifiers (DNN, CNN, RNN)
with both the IID and Non-IID data distribution strategies for
the Bot-IoT dataset. For the IID data distribution strategy,
the federated deep learning global models were able to
approximate the performance of the centralized learning
models. For the non-IDI data distribution strategy, the global
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FIGURE 14. The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for BoT-IoT dataset. (class 0: DDoS, class 1: DoS, class 2: Benign, class 3:
Reconnaissance, class 4: Theft.)

FIGURE 15. The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for MQTTset datasets. (class 0: Bruteforce, class 1: DoS, class 2: Flood, class 3:
Benign, class 4: Slowite, class 5: Malformed.)

FIGURE 16. The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for TON_IOT dataset. (class 0: Backdoor, class 1: Injection, class 2: Benign, class 3:
Password, class 4: Scanning, class 5: XSS.)

models struggled a bit to perform the same as in IID, which
is quite normal since the data samples were randomly distributed for all clients, however after 50 FL runs, the overall
138534

performance was pretty good. Fig 17 (b) and Fig 17 (c) illustrate the validation accuracy obtained by the federated deep
learning classifiers with the IID and Non-IID data distribution
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FIGURE 17. Learning performances.

strategies for the MQTTset and TON_IoT datasets, respectively. Similar to the first data set, the same observations apply
to these two experiments.
Tab. 11 present a detailed side-by-side comparison of
all accuracies obtained by all global models and the highest/lowest accuracy of the best/worst clients couple in every
set, across the first and the 50th round of federated deep
learning. The first observation is that in the IID data distribution strategy, the Best, Worst, and Global models are
closely related to each other consistently across all settings
and datasets, even though the clients are trained from different
VOLUME 9, 2021

class samples. The reason being that all clients can learn
from all classes. The second observation is that at the 50th
rounds of federated deep learning, the performance of all
global models managed to approach the performance of the
centralized model.
In the Non-IID case, at the first FL round, the Best, Worst,
and Global models are nowhere near one another, and this
is quite expected since not all clients were trained from all
classes. A good example is a Bot-IoT dataset, with the CNN
classifier, where K=15, the worst accuracy of the client was
01.00%, but with 50e of federated deep learning rounds, this
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TABLE 11. The evaluation results of federated deep learning approaches.

same client has an accuracy of 52.98% and the global model
achieved 90.35%. This means that this client was able to
benefit from the federated learning approach even though it
has very limited knowledge of the attack classes in its local
private data.

different IoT-based application areas, the practical implementation of federated learning presents several open challenges,
as discussed below.

3) COMPARISON

The study shows that the federated deep learning-based security and privacy systems can be applied for several types
of IoT applications, including, Industrial Internet of Things,
Edge Computing, Internet of Drones, Internet of Healthcare
Things, Cloud Computing, 5G-enabled IoT, Internet of Vehicles, Mobile Crowdsensing, etc.

The centralized intrusion detection approaches are capable of
detecting intrusions with high accuracy. However, there are
problems with these practices. First, and most importantly,
privacy issues, since it requires data to be collected at a single
entity, thus making it easier for an attacker to target a single
location for all data, if that single entity is compromised,
all sensitive data will be breached. Second, given the huge
flow of data coming from the end devices to that single
entity, latency, and processing is major concerns that must be
addressed.
Federated learning-based intrusion detection systems,
on the other hand, significantly decrease the previous
issues with decent detection accuracy, and in many cases,
it approached the performance of a centralized approach as
we showed with our federated deep learning models. Furthermore, by taking into account that the field of federated
learning is in its developmental stage, we expect that in
the future, federated learning will replace centralized and
traditional learning approaches in many machine learningbased domains, especially in areas where data privacy is a
real concern.
VII. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY
AND OPEN CHALLENGES

Federated learning is an emerging research area that is still in
its developmental stage. Although it has a lot of potential in
138536

A. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY
1) IoT APPLICATIONS

2) INTRUSION AND MALWARE DETECTION

The study presents the importance of using federated deep
learning by intrusion detection systems and malware detection systems as a decentralized machine learning approach
for detecting cyber security attacks in IoT networks.
3) WHEN FEDERATED LEARNING MEETS BLOCKCHAIN

The study shows that blockchain technology can be integrated
with federated deep learning for cyber security in IoT networks. This combination reduces the threat of data leakage
and enables data owners to have more control over the access
to stored and shared data.
4) VULNERABILITIES OF FEDERATED DEEP LEARNING

The study presents the importance of defending against the
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries in federated deep learning-based systems for IoT networks. These
adversaries can use cyber security attacks such as adversarial
attacks or poisoning attacks to degrading the accuracy of a
VOLUME 9, 2021
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machine learning model or deduce if an IoT device has been
involved in some mission from their local model updates.
5) FEDERATED DEEP LEARNING VERSUS CLASSICAL
MACHINE LEARNING

The primary motivation for conducting this study was to
investigate the effectiveness of federated deep learning versus conventional machine learning for cybersecurity in IoT
networks. Based on the performance evaluation under three
new real IoT traffic datasets, namely, the Bot-IoT dataset,
the MQTTset dataset, and the TON_IoT dataset, the study
demonstrates that federated deep learning approaches (i.e.,
CNN, RNN, and DNN) outperform the classic/centralized
versions of machine learning (non-federated learning) in
assuring the privacy of IoT device data and provide the higher
accuracy in detecting attacks.
B. OPEN CHALLENGES AND CONSIDERATIONS
1) SECURITY AND PRIVACY CHALLENGES

Federated learning promises to protect the privacy of local
user data, however, recent studies have shown that the
involvement of specific participants can still be revealed by
analyzing the global model [165]. Although some techniques
have been used to overcome this problem, including differential privacy [166], these approaches degrade model performance or require additional conditions that are not suitable
for IoT networks, especially high computing power [167].
Therefore, efficiently implemented federated approaches that
provide high performance and preserve privacy without additional computational overhead are strongly required for IoT
networks and applications.
2) IoT NETWORK SETTINGS CHALLENGES

The robustness of the federated deep learning system should
be considered since users and aggregators are required to
exchange parameters over the IoT network. In addition,
communication channels and computational power are constrained in terms of capacity, as well as the presence of
various network issues such as bandwidth, interference, and
noise [167]. Hence, client access and limited network reliability are significant research challenges in developing a
federated deep learning system for cyber security in IoT
applications.
3) DATA-RELATED CHALLENGES

The issue of identifying and eliminating bias of all kinds
(cognitive, sampling, reporting, and confirmation) in the data
generation process is a serious concern for ML research in
general. However, it is more complicated in FL due to the
fact that data is distributed over multiple parties. For example,
if IoT devices have varying data sizes, the FL-based system
may give more importance to the contributions of the populations. In addition, If the global model update depends on
the latency of the IoT network, then networks with slower
devices or networks may be under-represented [168]. The
VOLUME 9, 2021

most important question that may arise is how to develop a
new FL-based strategy that can resist the vulnerabilities (Poisoning attack, Jamming attack, Adversarial attack, . . . etc.)
while considering the practicability of deploying the solution,
particularly in the context of low-resource IoT devices.
4) FL PLATFORMS CHALLENGES

Many IoT-based applications can benefit from FL due to
the amazing performance of collaborative learning in the
appropriate domains. Although there are various emerging
frameworks for FL in general, designing a specific IoT framework based on FL is still an important research topic that
needs to take into account the underlying IoT infrastructure.
VIII. CONCLUSION

In this article, we conducted a comparative study with an
experimental analysis of federated deep learning approaches
for cybersecurity in IoT applications. Specifically, we analyzed the federated learning-based security and privacy
systems for several types of IoT applications, including,
Industrial IoT, Edge Computing, Internet of Drones, Internet of Healthcare Things, Internet of Vehicles, etc. Then,
we reviewed the federated learning systems with blockchain
and malware/intrusion detection systems for IoT applications. We reviewed the vulnerabilities that can be exploited
by adversaries in the federated learning-based security and
privacy systems. We provided an experimental analysis of
federated deep learning with three deep learning approaches,
namely, RNN, CNN, and DNN. For each deep learning
model, we studied the performance of centralized and federated learning under three IoT traffic datasets, namely,
the Bot-IoT dataset, the MQTTset dataset, and the TON_IoT
dataset. The results demonstrate that federated deep learning
approaches can outperform the classic/centralized versions
of machine learning (non-federated learning) in assuring the
privacy of IoT device data and provides the highest accuracy
in detecting attacks.
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